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I. INTRODUCTION
There are few personal injuries so emotion-laden as those of a
defective newborn. Birth defects trigger feelings of surprise, guilt, and
disappointment following an event that has been joyfully anticipated
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as a celebration of life. In times past parents could be expected to
adjust to their child's abnormality, recognizing the blessings of life in
whatever form and accepting the additional responsibilities that their
new child's special needs might present. But in today's litigious en-
vironment, shattered expectations can cause tough questions to be
asked: What went wrong? Who is to blame? And, inevitably, is some-
body legally liable? The frequency of drug use during pregnancy,' and
the knowledge that some drugs are teratogens, 2 may focus attention
on a drug used by a mother as the possible cause of a newborn's
injury.
If it can be shown with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty
that a drug ingested by a pregnant woman caused harm to the fetus,3
then the logical conclusion is that the harm could have been avoided
through non-ingestion of the drug. The question then becomes whether
ingestion of the drug would have been prevented if somebody along
the drug distribution chain had made a better decision about exposing
the fetus to the risk of harm. This article will examine the decisions
made by drug manufacturers, physicians, and pregnant women con-
cerning fetal exposure to risk. Also, given that a fetus is in no position
to avoid exposure to risk, this article will query to what degree drug
manufacturers, physicians, and pregnant women owe a duty to a fetus
to avoid exposure of the fetus to an unreasonable risk of harm.
A timely case-study for the consideration of these issues is the use
of the drug isotretinoin, 4 a significant breakthrough in the treatment
1. See generally Doering & Stewart, The Extent and Character of Drug Consumption During
Pregnancy, 239 J. A.M.A. 843 (1978); the investigators report that of 168 obstetrical patients monitored
during pregnancy, all received at least two different drug products during the prenatal period. Id. See
also Woodward, Brackbill, McManus, Doering & Robinson, Exposure to Drugs With Possible Adverse
Effects During Pregnancy and Birth, 9 BrTH 165 (1982); the investigators report that during pregnancy
64.5 percent of the women in their study took one or more drug products with implicated adverse fetal
effects, and that 68 percent of the drug ingredients pregnant women took had never been studied for
their effects on the fetus. Id.
2. A teratogen is an agent or factor that causes abnormal embryonic development. See, e.g.,
Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat. Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1523 (11th Cir. 1983); Dow Chemical Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
477 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1973). A "teratogenic" drug is one that causes a child to be born with
birth defects, and "teratogenicity" is the propensity of a chemical to cause birth defects.
3. This article will generally use the terms "fetus" and "pregnant woman" when the context is
pre-birth and the terms "child" and "mother" when the context is post-birth.
4. The commonly used brand name for isotretinoin is Accutane. It is part of a family of chemicals
closely related to Vitamin A and appears to work by shutting down production of excess oils under the
skin.
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of severe, recalcitrant cystic acne. However, it causes birth defects.
In spite of strong warnings against the use of isotretinoin during preg-
nancy, there have been children born with defects due to use of the
drug by pregnant women.5 The societal question this drug raises is
whether its availability should be severely restricted or eliminated in
order to assure total protection for everyone. There are alternatives
less restrictive than elimination which would require that strong meas-
ures be taken by everyone involved with drug distribution and use.6
The regulatory challenge presented by isotretinoin is to regulate the
drug so that all who need it get it, but with no resulting birth defects.
Failing that, a decision must be made whether a small number of
tragedies are the unavoidable price of the life-transforming benefits
isotretinoin can have for thousands of people.
While well-publicized and currently the focus of significant reg-
ulatory attention, the isotretinoin controversy may not serve as an
accurate model of decisionmaking regarding fetal risk from maternal
medication use. For instance, the teratogenic nature of isotretinoin is
well documented and can be easily communicated by one individual
to another. But for most drugs which have teratogenic potential, the
actual risk is less well known; thus, the risk is less obvious and more
difficult to describe to a decisionmaker. Furthermore, the maternal
condition isotretinoin treats is not a serious threat to physical health,
so a decision to forego drug use during pregnancy is less detrimental
to a pregnant woman than would be the decision to forego use of a
drug that is necessary to treat a serious physical condition. Never-
5. As of April 1988, there were 62 official reports of birth defects possibly attributed to isotretinoin.
A government memorandum speculated that the true number could be much higher, but the manufacturer
of isotretinoin refuted the data in the memorandum as inflammatory and essentially meaningless. See
FDA Attributes Hundreds of Birth Defects to Accutane, 1988 PHARMACEutncAL LnTIGATION REPORTER 3,
389-92.
6. For example, the prescribing of isotretinoin could be limited to certified physicians, and the
dispensing of isotretinoin could be limited to certified pharmacies. However, the FDA has never restricted
the writing of prescriptions by physicians since this is a matter of state law. Moreover, one attempt by
the agency to restrict the dispensing of a drug to certain pharmacies was judicially rejected. See, American
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, American Pharmaceutical
Ass'n v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Nevertheless, it may be possible for the FDA to
specify circumstances under which an approved drug may be prescribed. See Shapiro, Limiting Physician
Freedom to Prescribe a Drug for Any Purpose: The Need for FDA Regulation, 73 Nw. U. L. R-v. 801
(1978).
19881
3
Brushwood: Drug Induced Birth Defects: Difficult Decisions and Shared Respon
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
theless, regulatory reaction to the isotretinoin problem serves as an
example of what can be done to reduce teratogenic risks, and it invites
an analysis of whether similar regulatory activity should be undertaken
for other potentially teratogenic medications.
A. Regulatory Policy
Because the risks of harm from drug use are a significant concern
to the American public, the federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) makes decisions that may result in a drug being kept off the
market (direct regulation)7 or may require the disclosure of specified
information when a drug is marketed (indirect regulation).8 Decision-
making in drug regulation is difficult due to the unique character of
the drug product: drugs are not only injury-producing but also injury-
reducing. The unavailability of a drug may pose a greater threat to
public health and safety than the potential toxicity of the drug itself.9
Also, frequently it is not a characteristic of the drug but an idiosyn-
cratic reaction of the user that leads to unforeseeable damage as the
result of drug use.
7. The pre-marketing approval requirement was established in 1938 through passage by Congress
of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). This Act introduced the requirement
that "adequate tests" demonstrate that a new drug is safe for its intended use. There was no express
provision for effectiveness testing although efficacy was in fact considered for drugs that were known to
have serious side effects or were intended to treat life-threatening diseases. Id. Amendments in 1962
introduced the requirement that "substantial evidence" show that a drug is both safe and effective for
its intended purpose. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d) (1982). Amplification through rulemaking of this statutory
scheme has caused one commentator to describe the system as "the most detailed regulatory system for
the protection of human subjects the world has ever seen." Cooper, Untitled Remarks, 37 Food DRuo
Cosm. L.J. 49, 59 (1982). For a comprehensive discussion of the drug approval process, see generally
NEw DRuG DEvEpMENT: A REGtuATORY OvEivinw (M. Mathieu ed. 1987).
8. One method of regulating the safety of drugs is found in the misbranding provisions of the
Act which state that a drug will be deemed misbranded "[i]f it is dangerous to health when used in the
dosage or with the frequency or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof."
21 U.S.C. § 3520) (1972). For many drugs, labeling is monitored through the drug approval process.
The approval of a new drug application is based on the content of the labeling submitted with the
application. For a discussion of the consequences of regulating through information disclosure, see generally
S. HADDEN, READ THE LABEL: RnucINo Rimsc By Piovahzio INFORATION (1986).
9. For a period during the 1970's, the detriment of unavailable drugs was considered to be a
significant policy issue, with some people suggesting that the drug approval process should be hastened
by being less demanding about proof of safety or efficacy. See Kennedy, A Calm Look at "Drug Lag,"
239 J. A.M.A. 423 (1978).
[Vol. 91
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For prescription drugs ° the system of distribution includes two
layers of risk evaluation. Based upon information provided by the
manufacturer, the FDA first determines whether a drug's general ben-
efits exceed its general risks. If the drug is approved, then a second
risk evaluation takes place in which a physician determines for each
individual patient whether the benefit exceeds the risk." The first level
of risk evaluation takes into account scientific data with only limited
opportunity to consider human values, while the second level relates
more specifically to the user's lifestyle and attitude toward risk. The
system relies heavily upon the ability of scientists to express the pos-
sibility of harm as risk 12 and on the ability of regulators, physicians,
and patients to interpret that abstract expression of risk in light of
the multitude of other factors presented by the real world. 3
Decisions about exposure to drug risks have greater validity as the
certainty of available scientific information increases. Unfortunately,
while decisionmakers search for certainty to form the basis of a solid
decision, scientists thrive on uncertainty, for every scientific "fact"
is open to challenge in the face of new or better information. Because
today's decisionmakers cannot wait the years or decades it would take
to find the ultimate truth, as scientists would prefer, regulators have
developed a framework for managing scientific uncertainty. Within
this framework, standards are developed regarding the degree of risk
society deems acceptable, procedures are outlined for qualified experts
10. A prescription drug is a "drug intended for use by man which. . . because of its toxicity or
other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to
its use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer
such drug. . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(B) (1972). The prescription requirement has been criticized in
recent years as being overly broad in its current form, sometimes serving as a disincentive for patients
to acquire information necessary to make a decision about their own treatment. See Mitchell, Deregulating
Mandatory Medical Prescription, 12 Am. J. Low & MED. 207 (1987).
11. A drug is approved as safe not because it is harmless but because its benefits outweigh its
risks. The physician must decide which treatment among those available will do more good than harm
for a particular patient. See McMahon, How Safe Should Drugs Be?, 249 J. A.M.A. 481 (1983). Patients
themselves are involved in risk analysis in varying degrees. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
12. See generally U.S. DEPARTuENT OF HEALTH AN HUmAN SmtvicEs TASK FORCE ON HEALTH
RisK AssEssMENT, DETrEan]NG RisKs TO HEALTH (1986).
13. These other factors include workplace environment, economics and spousal support. A pregnant
chemical factory worker whose husband is unemployed may not be able to follow medical advice to take
nine months of maternity leave if in doing so there is no way to feed, clothe, and house herself and the
fetus she carries.
1988]
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to follow in evaluating risk, and the uncertainty factor is accounted
for by recognizing the need for qualified experts to subjectively ex-
ercise informed judgment that is properly guided and carefully re-
viewed.
The drug regulatory system works well, but it is not perfect. A
number of drugs14 have survived the arduous approval process only
to be withdrawn from the market within months when unanticipated
toxicities materialized after exposure in a large population of users.
Public confidence in the regulatory assurance of safety has been weak-
ened by highly publicized experiences with diethylstilbestrol (DES), the
swine flu vaccine, and the Dalkon Shield. At the same time, faith in
technology generally has been challenged by technological disasters
such as the space shuttle and Three Mile Island. The predictable public
response has been to question whether decisions are being made ap-
propriately by regulators and to suggest that "full disclosure" of avail-
able information would permit product users to make their own
decisions or to critically evaluate decisions made by regulators. 5
While full disclosure is an appealing concept, it does not fit well
into the overall framework of drug regulation because of the under-
lying scientific uncertainty. Disclosure of documented scientific find-
ings can facilitate a decision, but disclosure of uncertainty can impede
14. The drugs are ticrynafen (trade name Selacryn), benoxaprofin (trade name Oraflex), zomepirac
(trade name Zomax), and nomefensine (trade name Merital). Each of these drugs withstood careful scrutiny
by the FDA during lengthy clinical trials to assess safety and efficacy, but once they were approved and
widely distributed, adverse effects began to appear.
15. The full disclosure requirements of drug labeling are really not what they appear to be. A
general statement of the policy is as follows:
In approving the labeling the Food and Drug Administration must determine both that the
content is entirely truthful, and that it omits no information pertinent to the safe and effective
prescribing of the drug by the physician. Congress intended the labeling to be a full, complete,
honest, and accurate appraisal of the important facts that have reliably been proved about the
drug.
Legal Status of Approved Labeling For Prescription Drugs, 37 Fed.Reg. 16,504 (1972) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. § 130). The intent is not to require disclosure of all information, but only that which has been
reliably proved. While the paternalistic notion that patients (either themselves or through their physicians)
do not need access to all information about a drug they use has the potential to deny the right to
autonomous decision making, it is important to recognize that warnings themselves may be costly. "One
must warn with discrimination since the consumer is being asked to discriminate and to react accordingly.
The story of the boy who cried wolf is an anology worth contemplating when considering the imposition
of a warning in a case of rather marginal risk." Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product
Liability - Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CoRsnu. L. REv. 495, 514 (1976).
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decisions, particularly if the decisionmaker faces the prospect of being
held responsible for a bad decision based on uncertain information.
Uncertainty is a particular problem in the area of teratogenicity where
moral considerations prohibit comparative studies in humans. Epi-
demiological studies provide useful scientific data, but they can never
rule out the possibility that a substance may cause birth defects.1 6 The
burden of uncertainty weighs heavily on those who make decisions
about fetal exposure to harm. Because drug manufacturers, physicians,
and pregnant women each have a distinct decisionmaking role, they
share this burden. To the extent that the law recognizes a right of
recovery by a child born with anomalies caused by in utero exposure
to a drug, it is important that the law also recognize the character
of the decisionmaking responsibility of those who could have reduced
fetal exposure to the risk of harm and insure that regulatory policy
facilitates the types of decisions that must be made.
B. Liability for Prenatal Injury
A threshold consideration in any discussion of legal liability for
fetal harm is the lengthy line of cases concerning liability for prenatal
injury. The initial case is Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,17
which established in 1884 that there can be no recovery for injuries
suffered by a child en ventre sa mere. 8 Over the next several decades,
the following justifications of the Dietrich rule emerged: the possibility
of parental liability; 19 absence of a duty to an unborn child because
it is part of its mother;20 danger of spurious or fraudulent claims; 2'
and difficulties in proving causation.2
In 1946, a new trend began with Bonbrest v. Katz,2 which held
that a child born alive may recover for injuries suffered before birth
16. See infra notes 64-65, and accompanying text.
17. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
18. Id. En ventre sa mere is an oft used French phrase which translates as "in its mother's womb."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 479 (5th ed. 1979). It is preferred by the judiciary over the synonymous phrase,
"in utero," which is commonly used in the medical field.
19. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
20. Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
21. Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926), rev'd, Husky v.
Smith, 289 Ala. 56, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972), rev'd, Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973).
22. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
23. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
1988]
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if the fetus was viable at the time of injury. The Bonbrest rule was
justified as a legal reflection of medical progress and as a way to
provide a remedy for an obvious wrong. This rule, or variants of it,
have now been adopted in all jurisdictions.2A
Recent litigation based on the Bonbrest rule has become complex,
both conceptually and semantically. Distinctions are based on whether
the lawsuit is brought on behalf of the parents or child and on whether
the child was born healthy or impaired. A "wrongful pregnancy"
action is brought by the parents of a healthy, but unplanned child,
where the complaint alleges pre-conception negligence by a physician,
pharmaceutical manufacturer or pharmacist regarding a contraceptive
procedure or medication that did not work.21 In a "wrongful birth"
case, the parents of a deformed or handicapped child are suing for
alleged post-conception negligence of a physician or other party whose
failure to act prevented the parents from exercising their option to
terminate the pregnancy. 2 A "wrongful life" claim is brought by or
on behalf of a child who suffers an impairment, 27 this action being
difficult to distinguish from the parents' wrongful birth claim, except
for the virtual unanimous rejection by the courts of the wrongful life
claim. The pragmatic reason for courts having spurned this theory is
the difficulty of rationally determining whether the plaintiff has suf-
fered a legally cognizable injury by having been born. Furthermore,
as a matter of policy, courts have steered away from a theory that
assumes nonexistence is desirable.28
Acceptance of the wrongful life theory in a drug-induced birth
defect case first occurred in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis Inc.,29 the court
overcoming the concerns expressed in previous cases. In an analysis
24. See Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972). The Alabama Supreme Court
acknowledged that it was the final jurisdiction to recognize a cause of action for prenatal injuries.
25. See Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983),
aff'd, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
26. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
27. See Curlender v. Bio-Sciences Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
28. For an insightful discussion of judicial policy see Morreim, The Concept of Harm Reconceived:
A Different Look at Wrongful Life, 7 L. & Pimnosopmr 3 (1988).
29. Harbeson v. Parke Davis Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483; Harbeson v. Parke Davis,
Inc., 746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1984). There are two separate opinions in Harbeson. The federal opinion
is the liability case while the state opinion answers certified questions from the federal court.
[Vol. 91
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of this case, Professor Furrow used the phrase "diminished life," 30
which he had coined earlier.3' The concept of diminished life, as sug-
gested by Furrow, relates to the difference between a defective child
who claims that it would be better not to have been born because
accurate genetic counseling would have led to an abortion, as opposed
to a defective child who claims that it would be better to have been
born without the defect because counseling regarding teratogenicity
would have led to a drug not being used by the mother. In the case
of the first child, the defendant's alleged negligence is passive, it being
a failure to act to prevent the birth of a child whose defect was not
caused by the defendant. In the case of the second child, the defen-
dant's alleged negligence is active. By distributing or prescribing a drug
without an adequate warning, the action of the defendant has caused
the child's defect. Because damages are clear and the value of life is
not questioned, diminished life as a theory of recovery is free of the
pragmatic and policy concerns that attend the wrongful life action.
Thus, a court need not decide whether nonexistence is better than
impaired existence.
Yet, Professor Furrow falls short of fully developing the theory
implicit in the phrase "diminished life." His logic closely follows that
of the court in Harbeson, which relied heavily on prior case law in
the areas of genetic counseling and prenatal testing. 32 However, the
facts in Harbeson differ from those of the typical genetic counseling
or prenatal testing case, 33 specifically the facts relating to the nature
of the decision to be made by the woman who is to bear the possibly
defective child. In a drug induced birth defect case like Harbeson,
the woman may choose not just to avoid or terminate pregnancy, but
may instead choose to forego use of the drug during the period of
pregnancy when the developing fetus is at risk. Because the facts in
Harbeson are briefly summarized by the court, it is difficult to de-
termine which decision the mother would likely have made.34
30. Furrow, Impaired Children and Tort Remedies: The Emergence of a Consensus, 11 LAw, MED.
& HELTH CARE 148 (1983).
31. Furrow, Diminished Lives and Malpractice: Courts Stalled in Transition, 10 LAw, MED. &
HEALT CARE 100 (1982).
32. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483.
33. Id.
34. The federal court opinion concerning liability and the state court opinion concerning certified
1988]
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In 1970, Mr. and Mrs. Harbeson conceived their first child, a
healthy child, even though in December 1970 Mrs. Harbeson was given
the drug Dilantin for epilepsy, which she took for the remainder of
her pregnancy. 5 In the ensuing year, several other anticonvulsants
were prescribed for Mrs. Harbeson, which were discontinued after she
suffered adverse reactions. When the Harbesons contemplated having
more children, they consulted three physicians, all of whom indicated
that in utero exposure to Dilantin could cause cleft palate, which could
be surgically repaired, and hirsutism, a temporary condition of excess
hair. 6 The Harbesons had two more children while Mrs. Harbeson
was taking Dilantin, and both children were born with "Fetal Hy-
dantoin Syndrome" (FSH), the risk of which the Harbesons had not
been told.37 The issue in their legal action was the adequacy of the
information they were given and their right to act upon that infor-
mation.38 The court assumed that the Harbesons' position was that
they would not have had more children had they been told about the
risk of FSH, and this may be a valid assumption. 39 But the Harbesons
may instead have wanted to make the decision not to use the drug
and have children. They knew that not all children exposed to Dilantin
in utero suffer birth defects, as their first child was healthy despite
exposure. They also knew that there were alternatives to Dilantin be-
cause Mrs. Harbeson had tried them. Perhaps the adverse effects of
one of those alternatives that previously had been rejected would have
been acceptable during pregnancy if it lowered the risk of birth defects.
In the analysis of a case where the primary thrust is the right to make
an informed decision, this is a consideration that should not be dis-
regarded.
questions have different factual summaries. To create the most useful fact statement, it is necessary to
extract certain facts from each opinion.
35. Harbeson v. Parke Davis Inc., 98 Wash. 460, 656 P.2d at 486 (1984).
36. Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 519.
37. FSH children suffer from mild to moderate growth deficiencies, mild to moderate developmental
retardation, wide-set eyes, lateral ptosis (drooping eyelids), hypoplasia of the fingers, small nails, low-set
hairline, broad nasal ridge, and other physical and developmental defects. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 463,
656 P.2d at 486.
38. Both the state and federal opinions characterize the issue as one of "informed consent." Id.
at 469, 656 P.2d at 490; Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 522.
39. "The Harbesons consulted the doctors to decide if they should have additional children, not
to decide whether Mrs. Harbeson should terminate her treatment." Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 525.
[Vol. 91
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Diminished life, as recognized by Furrow and developed through
the facts of Harbeson, is an attractive alternative to wrongful life in
a case where liability for prenatal injury is based on inadequate warn-
ing that a drug may cause birth defects. Where the avoidance of a
risk will result in a healthy child, materialization of that risk through
the absence of a warning clearly reduces the quality and value of a
life that would have been undiminished but for the failure to warn.
Therefore, pragmatic and policy concerns that may have been a barrier
to plaintiffs in genetic counseling or prenatal testing cases should pose
no problem when a prenatal injury is allegedly due to exposure to a
drug.
C. Fetal Rights
Legal recognition of the fetus as an entity with its own rights
occurred first in property law where the fetus was given the status of
a person solely for the purpose of inheritance and subject to the con-
dition that it later be born alive.40 The live birth requirement has also
been incorporated into criminal statutes, many of which recognize fetal
existence but impose criminal penalties for harm to the fetus only
after the victim has been born.41 Adherence to a live birth requirement
limits the right of a fetus because there is no recognition of the fetus
as separate from the woman prior to birth. In this regard, the early
cases in property law and criminal law are more a recognition of the
woman's rights during pregnancy than of fetal rights.
Until recently the medical view of the fetus was, likewise, signif-
icant only with respect to the woman's pregnancy. But technological
advancements now make it possible to view the fetus as a patient
separate from the pregnant woman, with numerous fetal conditions
being amenable to treatment. 42 Furthermore, there have been legal
conflicts resulting in recognition that an unborn child has the right
40. See, e.g., Medlock v. Brown, 163 Ga. 520, 136 S.E. 551 (1927); Christian v. Carter, 193 N.C.
537, 137 S.E. 596 (1927). But see In re Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 158 N.E.2d 841, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1959) (holding that a fetus is mnot a person until it sees the light of day).
41. See, e.g., People v. Greer, 79 IIL. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); Keeler v. Superior Court,
2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
42. See Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333
(1982).
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to protection when the woman carrying the child refuses a blood
transfusion 4 or when she refuses to consent to delivery by cesarean
section.44 These developments have the unfortunate potential of plac-
ing a fetus and a pregnant woman in the position of adversaries, where
the rights of each are balanced against the other.
However, the precise nature of fetal rights has not yet clearly
evolved through the litigation process. Since a popular view of the
concept of duty is that legal duties of one party correspond with rights
of the other party, a determination of the rights of the fetus is a step
toward recognizing the duties owed to a fetus by a drug manufacturer,
caregiver, or pregnant woman. Just as the existence of a right can
create a duty, the character of a right can shape the framework of
a duty.
One short-lived judicial characterization of fetal rights was referred
to as the right "to be born as a whole, functioning human being. '45
This overly broad claim was later rejected by a higher court in the
same jurisdiction. 46 A somewhat less-encompassing right has been re-
ferred to as "a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body. '47
While this right may be fundamental, if it exists, it cannot be absolute.
It is essentially an argument for the right to perfect health, which
may be considered a moral right, but which has not been recognized
under the law.48 It is an argument for the right to a risk-free in utero
existence. But a fetus can have no such right. If a fetus is life, then
the risks of living accompany that status. If a fetus is not life, then
there are no rights. When the fetus is considered to be a patient, then
the greatest right it can have is the right to careful consideration of
risks and benefits prior to a treatment decision.
A perspective on fetal rights that is consistent with medical prin-
ciples and that helps clarify duties to the fetus in a drug exposure
43. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537
(1964).
44. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
45. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 87-89, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (1977).
46. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
47. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
48. The law has never recognized that a patient has the right to a good outcome from medical
care. The best that can be expected is that medical practitioners will exercise the degree of skill and care
commonly used in the profession.
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situation is proposed by Professor Capron within the context of ge-
netic counseling.49 Capron argues that a fetus has the right to have
its parents decide what is in its best interest. 0 If one accepts this
argument, then effectively the fetus is placed on equal footing with
other patients who must have a decision made for them because they
lack the capacity to make the decision themselves. Exposure to a drug
involves possible benefits and possible detriments that must be weighed
when making a decision. Applying Capron's logic to a fetal drug
exposure case, it becomes a fetal right to have a decision regarding
use of a possibly teratogenic drug made in such a way that consid-
eration is given to the potential detriment to the fetus in light of all
relevant factors.
Presumably, the person best able to consider fetal risks is the woman
who carries the fetus. Only she can hazard a guess as to how life will
be for the child if it is born with an impairment, given the variability
of family situations and parenting skills. But her decision can only
be as sound as the information she is given, and adequate information
must be given by the manufacturer to the physician who can help the
woman understand the information and appreciate its significance to
her and her fetus.
While the fetus has the right to have a competent decisionmaker
consider the fetus' best interests and while the woman is presumed
to be the best person to fulfill that responsibility, there may occa-
sionally be a conflict of interest when a drug will benefit only the
woman and harm only the child. Where the potential benefit to the
woman is slight and the potential harm to the child is great, a logical
extension of fetal rights is to impose a duty on physicians to carefully
consider fetal risk prior to prescribing and not to prescribe the drug
if fetal risk outweighs maternal benefit. Likewise, if pharmaceutical
manufacturers and the government agencies that regulate them learn
that a drug is routinely being used in a way that is of marginal benefit
to women but of significant risk to the fetus, then there is a duty
49. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 CoLtui. L. Rnv. 618 (1979).
50. In Capron's analysis, harm emerges not from impaired existence but from breach of the phy-
sician's duty of informed consent. Id. at 652.
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either to expand the warnings in the labeling for the drug or to restrict
the distribution of the drug.
II. TERATOGENICITY
A. Mechanisms of Teratogenicity
For a drug ingested by a pregnant woman to cause teratogenesis
in the fetus, it must cross the placenta from the maternal to the fetal
circulation. 1 Once thought of as a barrier, the placenta is now known
to permit passage of all but the largest molecules. Most drugs with
a molecular weight of less than 600 atomic mass units easily cross the
placenta, while molecules greater than 1000 atomic mass units gen-
erally do not cross at all. Unfortunately, most drugs have a molecular
weight between 250 and 400 atomic mass units.2
Whether a drug will produce teratogenic effects once it has crossed
the placenta depends on the susceptibility of the fetus. Timing is a
significant factor. Before the eleventh or twelfth day following con-
ception, the organism is not susceptible to teratogenesis in the sense
that drug exposure may cause the live birth of a defective child. The
effect is all or none. Either the drug will kill the organism, or un-
affected cells will overcome the damage to affected cells caused by
the drug.53 Beyond that initial phase, the developing organism becomes
sufficiently differentiated to survive with damage done to one or sev-
eral structures or systems. The critical period of organogenesis5 4 is the
first trimester of pregnancy, when major anatomical malformations
may be induced. Later in pregnancy, exposure of the fetus to a ter-
atogen may cause behavioral, biochemical, or developmental changes.55
51. Hays, Teratogenesis: A Review of the Basic Principles With a Discussion of Selected Agents
Part I, 15 DRUG INTELLIGENCE & CLINICA. PHARMAcY 444 (1981).
52. Mirkin, Maternal and Fetal Distribution of Drugs in Pregnancy, 14 CLINIcAL PHARMACY &
TlmaAPmlcs 643 (1973).
53. J. NIran, DRUG UsE IN PREGNANCY (1988).
54. Organogenesis is defined as the formation of organs during development. STEumAN's MEDICAL
DiCTIONARY (24th ed.) (1982).
55. J. NIEBYL, DRUG USE IN PREGNANCY 3 (1988).
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The specific mechanism of action of teratogenic drugs is not well
understood. 6 However, it is known that there is variation in suscep-
tibility. If a known teratogen were given to a group of pregnant women,
the incidence of defects would probably be less than 100%. There are
a number of possible explanations for this variation. Maternal smok-
ing or alcohol consumption may induce fetal enzymes to metabolize
drugs to either activate or deactivate a drug's teratogenic potential.5 7
Genetic factors can also be responsible for differences in teratogenic
susceptibility. 8 Occupational exposure to certain toxic substances and
the concomitant use of other drugs may provoke a potentially tera-
togenic drug.59 Finally, the teratogenic response will increase in fre-
quency and degree as dosage increases. 60 As knowledge of each of
these factors increases, so will the likelihood increase that users of
potentially teratogenic drugs will be able to determine the probability
that their child will suffer the teratogenic effect based on the presence
or absence of other variables. Therefore, the possibility is raised that
women who wish to use a potentially teratogenic drug during preg-
nancy may modify their behavior in some fashion other than avoid-
ance of the drug and still minimize fetal risk.
56. Drugs may act either directly on the embryonic organ that is to be malformed later or indirectly
by causing some disturbance in embryonic or maternal tissues that will secondarily induce defective de-
velopment. See generally H. TucumsA-Dusasss, DRUG EFFECTS oN THE FErus (1975). Suspected me-
chanisms by which teratogenic agents may impinge upon developing cells to change their course are (1)
mutation; (2) chromosomal nondisjunction and breaks; (3) mitotic interference; (4) alteration of nucleic
acid integrity of function; (5) depletion of precursors and/or substrates needed for biosynthesis; (6) al-
teration of energy sources; (7) enzyme inhibition; (8) osmolar imbalances; and (9) alteration of cellular
membrane characteristics. See J. WHsoN, ENvmowimNTr & BmmRr DEmcTs (1973).
57. The term "fetal tobacco syndrome" is applied to an infant if: (1) the mother smoked five or
more cigarettes a day throughout pregnancy, (2) the mother had no evidence of hypertension during
pregnancy, (3) the newborn has symmetrical growth retardation, and (4) there is no other obvious cause
of intrauterine growth retardation. See Neiberg, Marks & McLaren, The Fetal Tobacco Syndrome, 253
J. A.M.A. 2998-99 (1986). "Fetal alcohol syndrome," while first thought to occur in the offspring of
heavy drinkers, is now known to occur with moderate drinkers as well. See Little, Asker & Sampson,
Fetal Growth and Moderate Drinking in Early Pregnancy, 123 Am. J. EpmEhoLOGY 270 (1986).
58. See generally K. Jones, Teratogens: What We Do and Don't Know About Them, in GENETIc
ISSUES IN PEDIATRIC & OBsTERc PRACTICE Chap. 6 (M. Kahak ed. 1981).
59. See generally Council on Scientific Affairs, Effects of Toxic Chemicals on the Reproductive
System, 253 J. A.M.A. 3431 (1985).
60. See generally Jauchau & Faustman-Watts, Pharmacokinetic Considerations in the Maternal-
Placental-Fetal Unit, 26 CuN. OBsTmucs & GYNECOLOGY 379 (1983).
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B. Teratogenicity Testing
The background or base level of malformations in humans is high
enough to make it difficult to detect an agent contributing only slightly
to the occurrence of fetal abnormalities since many other indistin-
guishable causal factors may also contribute to the appearance of birth
defects. Therefore, the recognition of a teratogenic agent in humans
is often difficult. Traditional methods of testing drug safety, where
clinical trials are conducted comparing the incidence of an adverse
effect in exposed and unexposed populations, are severely limited in
teratogenicity testing for moral reasons. The result is that the most
reliable data come either from animal experiments in which agents
* are administered at high doses throughout the period of organogenesis
or from epidemiologic surveys of women who usually have had low
dose exposure at unknown time periods and frequencies. However,
it can never be categorically stated that a drug is a non-teratogen; the
most that can be said is that effects have not been observed in the
studies conducted.6 1
The regulatory guidelines for animal reproductive studies issued
by the FDA have become standard as a screen for teratogenicity.62
Two test species are used, most frequently the rat and rabbit. Pregnant
females are dosed daily with the test compound during organogenesis
and are killed prior to birth of the offspring. The uterus is removed,
and fetuses are examined for external, visual and skeletal anomalies.
Different dosages are administered, and a "no observable effect level"
is determined. This dose is then divided by a safety factor to determine
a safe dose for humans. Unfortunately, while animal tests may reveal
teratogenic activity, they do not necessarily correlate well with risks
in humans. 63
After a drug has been marketed for a period of time, it may be
possible to use epidemiologic methods to examine a relationship be-
61. A complete analysis of the significance of teratogenicity testing is included in I Drug Product
Liability (MB) § 4.
62. See generally Palmer, Regulatory Requirements for Reproductive Toxicology: Theory and Prac-
tice in DavEiopmiEir ToXIcoLOGy (C. Kimmel & 3. Bueldki-Sam eds. 1981).
63. 1 Drug Product Liability (MB) § 4.04(4).
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tween exposure and outcome in humans. 64 Two major methods of
epidemiologic studies exist. A cohort study is a prospective method
in which groups of individuals who differ in exposure are observed
to determine whether they differ in the occurrence of the outcome of
interest. The case-control method, on the other hand, is retrospective,
focusing on groups that differ in the presence of the outcome variable
to determine whether the groups also differ in terms of past exposure.
Both methods require extensive statistical analysis to determine whether
chance alone can be ruled out as the reason for an association between
exposure and outcome.65 With both methods, the larger the number
of subjects studied, the more reliable the information will be. Thus,
only after a significant period of human exposure can there be firm
data on which to base a conclusion that a drug poses an appreciable
risk of harm to the fetus. In the interim, there is a high level of
scientific uncertainty.
C. Teratogenicity Information
The acquisition of information serves little purpose unless the in-
formation is conveyed in an orderly fashion to those who need the
information to make decisions. In an effort to increase the amount
of information available concerning teratogenicity and to standardize
the way the information is expressed to facilitate comparisons, the
FDA has adopted a letter-coded categorization of drugs based on their
risk to the fetus. 6 The letters A, B, C, D, and X are used, with the
fetal risk increasing as the letter goes farther down the alphabet (i.e.,
"A" equals the least risk, "X" equals the highest risk) 67This system
64. See generally 0. HiNONEN, D. SLoNE, S. SHARo, BIRTH DE-cis AND DRUGS IN PREGNANCY
(1977).
65. See Black and Lilienfeld, Epidemologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FoswAn, L. Rav.
732 (1984).
66. 21 C.F.R. § 3201.57 (1988).
67. The significance of the categories is as follows:
Category A: Controlled studies in women fail to demonstrate a risk to the
fetus in the first trimester (and there is no evidence of a risk in
later trimesters), and the possibility of fetal harm appears remote.
Category B: Neither animal-reproduction studies have demonstrated a fetal
risk, but there are no controlled studies in pregnant women or
animal reproduction studies which have shown an adverse effect
(other than a decrease in fertility) that was not confirmed in con-
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applies only to prescription drugs, so it is usually included in the
labeling directed to the physician, not to the patient.6
To determine the level of compliance with the standardized letter-
coded system, this author undertook a survey of the labeling for the
100 most frequently prescribed drug products. 9 The labeling for each
of the products was located and reviewed.70 The results of the survey
are displayed in Table 1. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that only
fifty-nine products had labeling that used the standardized system.
The labeling of nine products contained no information at all con-
cerning fetal risk. Twenty-two products specifically warned of positive
evidence of fetal risk, either by using a lettered category (twelve prod-
ucts) or by extensively explaining the risk (ten products). Only one
product was classified as category A; however, thirteen additional
products were labeled as category B, which also expresses the absence
of a demonstrated fetal risk. The majority of products (fifty-five) were
trolled studies in women in the first trimester (and there is no ev-
idence of a risk in later trimesters).
Category C: Either studies in animals have revealed adverse effects on the
fetus (teratogenic or embryocidal or other) and there are no con-
trolled studies in women, or studies in women and animals are not
available. Drugs should be given only if the potential benefit jusifies
the potential risk to the fetus.
Category D: There is positive evidence of human fetal risk, but the benefits
from use in pregnant women may be acceptable despite the risk
(e.g., if the drug is needed in a life-threatening situation, or for
a serious disease for which safer drugs cannot be used or are in-
effective).
Category X: Studies in animals or human beings have demonstrated fetal
abnormalities or there is evidence of fetal risk based on human
experience or both, and the risk of the use of the drug in pregnant
women clearly outweighs any possible benefit. The drug is con-
traindicated in women who are or may become pregnant.
21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(6) (1988).
68. For nonprescription drugs the FDA has also taken action to deal with the possibility that these
drugs may have adverse effects on the developing fetus. In 1982, the FDA issued a regulation requiring
the labeling for nonprescription drugs to include a precautionary statement concerning use in pregnancy.
21 C.F.R. § 201.63 (1988). When there is evidence that use of a particular drug may pose a risk of
reproductive toxicity, the agency has required more specific warning statements. For example, the tentative
final monograph for laxative products provides for a warning against use of mineral oil laxatives by
pregnant women because that ingredient may interfere with absorption of Vitamin K in pregnant women
and predispose newborn children to hemorrhagic disease. 50 Fed. Reg. 2134, 2154 (Jan. 15, 1985).
69. The list of the top 100 products was taken from the AMmEcAN DRuCJiST (Apr. 1988).
70. For most products, labeling was reviewed as printed in the PrYsictAN's Dasi REFERENCE. For
the balance of products, labeling was located, in local pharmacies.
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either labeled as category C (thirty-three products), or were not letter-
coded but included a minimal statement very similar to that of cat-
egory C regarding fetal risk (twenty-two products). That statement
usually read, "Safety for use in pregnancy has not been established.
This drug should be given only if the potential benefit outweighs the
potential harm to the fetus."' 71 These fifty-five products are of par-
ticular interest both because of their frequent use and because of the
ambiguity in their fetal risk labeling.
TABLE 1
Fetal Risk Expressed in Drug Product Labeling
100 most Frequently Prescribed Products (1987)
Type of Information Number of Products
Letter-coded
A 1
B 13
C 33
D 1
X 11
Not letter-coded
no information 9
minimal information 22
extensive information 10
100
Ambiguous warnings that disclose no hard data about fetal risk
but which admonish that this risk should be balanced against the
benefit prior to use place the decisionmaker in a quandary. How can
the uncertainty of fetal risk be balanced against the certainty of ma-
ternal benefit? The only completely safe decision is to not use the
drug. If this is the correct choice, then pregnant women would be
denied the benefit of seventy-six of the top 100 drug products (twenty-
one known or suspected teratogens plus fifty-five uncertainties). Ac-
71. This exact language appeared in several labels. Others were very similar.
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tually this is not quite correct. Since teratogenic drugs usually act early
in pregnancy, oftentimes before the pregnancy is confirmed, any woman
who may be pregnant would be denied these drugs. Theoretically this
could mean any fertile and sexually active female. The burden of
scientific uncertainty for the fifty-five ambiguously labeled drugs would
be borne by these women in the form of foregone therapeutic benefit.
A less conservative approach than a decision not to use the drugs
would impose a comparable burden on the woman, who could be
responsible for having caused a birth defect should one occur.
The inadequacies of existing drug labeling for fetal risk undoubt-
edly parallel the difficulties experienced by those whose job it is to
test for fetal risk. Unfortunately, the response to this problem cur-
rently is to label inadequately tested products with a caution that serves
no useful purpose. Making decisions based on known risk is difficult
enough; good decisions based on unexplained uncertainty are impos-
sible.
III. TERATOGENICITY LITIGATION
A. The Mllanufacturer as Defendant
Drug product liability is an active area of litigation in which there
have been a large number of cases alleging that a manufacturer should
be liable for birth defects suffered by a child born to a woman who
used the manufacturer's drug while she was pregnant. 72 A decade of
caselaw has resolved many legal issues but has done little to clarify
the proper use of uncertain scientific principles in a process that seeks
a certain resolution to a controversy based on limited hard data. The
result is that most teratogenicity litigation rests heavily on conflicting
expert testimony and on the ability of lawyers to either impeach the
opponent's experts or to rehabilitate their own experts. 71
72. Most drug product liability cases are brought under a warning defect (failure to warn) theory.
A discussion of the general principles of drug product liability is beyond the scope of this article. For
a comprehensive discussion see Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. I
(1973); Maedgen & McCall, A Survey of Law Regarding the Liabiity of Manufacturers and Sellers of
Drug Products and Medical Devices, 18 ST. MARY'S L. J. 395 (1986).
73. The frustration that may accompany an evaluation of expert testimony in a drug induced birth
defect case was evident in the comments of Judge Glasser of the District Court for the Eastern District
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One of the earlier opinions to establish the legal parameters of a
fetal harm case is Woodill v. Parke-Davis?4 The parents of a minor
child sought to recover damages for injuries suffered in utero, the
injuries having allegedly been caused by the drug Pitocin.75 The issue
of primary concern was whether, in an action seeking to hold a de-
fendant strictly liable for failure to warn of a danger attendant to the
use of the drug, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant
knew or should have known of the danger. 76 The court held that the
imposition of a knowledge requirement is a proper limitation to place
on a manufacturer's strict liability in tort predicated upon a failure
to warn of a danger inherent in a product. The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that to require knowledge to be alleged and proved
infuses negligence principles into strict liability. The court reasoned
that the failure-to-warn theory in strict liability is distinguishable from
negligence: it is the inadequacy of the warning that is looked to, rather
than the conduct of the manufacturer, when establishing strict lia-
bility.-n
The reasoning of Woodill was reinforced and updated in Brown
v. Superior Court.78 Brown is actually the consolidation of a number
of cases, each brought against numerous drug manufacturers which
allegedly produced diethylstilbestrol (DES). The plaintiffs alleged that
the drug was defective and that they were injured in utero when their
of New York in his opinion in Rubinstein v. Marsh, Prod. Liab. Rep. 11,624 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). Judge
Glasser said:
To the extent that these witnesses undertook to testify, they did so not as detached scholars
in the area of birth malformations motivated by the sole purpose of assisting the fact-finder
with an objective evaluation of the relevant data but as partisans. When expert witnesses become
partisans, objectivity is sacrificed to the need to win. Id.
Judge Glasser also chastised plaintiff's counsel with the following non-comment:
I will refrain from commenting upon the extent to which this litigation may have compounded
the emotional trauma caused by the defects with which the twins were born; the extent to
which expectations of huge awards may have been encouraged and subsequently dashed; the
extent to which energies were devoted to winning a lawsuit perhaps at a cost to other values.
Id.
The poignancy of the human factor is obvious when a federal judge is moved to make such comments.
One cannot help but wonder what the emotional impact must be on a juror deliberating in such a case.
74. WoodiU v. Parke Davis, 79 M11. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
75. Id. at 29, 402 N.E.2d at 195.
76. Id. at 30, 402 N.E.2d at 196.
77. Id. at 37-38, 402 N.E.2d at 199-200.
78. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988).
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mothers ingested it.79 The court concluded that a drug manufacturer's
liability for a defectively designed drug should not be measured by
the standards of strict liability.80 Furthermore, the court rejected the
plaintiff's assertion that a drug manufacturer should be held strictly
liable for failure to warn of risks inherent in a drug even though it
did not know and could not have known, by the application of sci-
entific knowledge available at the time of distribution, that the drug
could produce the undesirable side effects suffered by the plaintiff.8'
In essence, this approach relieves the drug manufacturer of the burden
of the scientific uncertainty that accompanies the distribution of an
as yet undocumented teratogen. The approach makes good sense if
the alternative would place the manufacturer in the position of a vir-
tual insurer of the product, serving as a barrier to research and de-
velopment of beneficial drugs. But if the manufacturer does not bear
the burden of uncertainty, then that burden must shift to the physician
and patient.
The legal requisites of an action against a manufacturer for dam-
ages suffered in utero are established by Woodill and Brown and other
similar cases. Within these parameters, expert testimony is relied upon
to determine whether the defendant's drug caused the plaintiff's birth
defect and to determine the reasonable expectations of the manufac-
turer in developing and marketing its product. Since most of this
testimony rests on inconclusive data, opinions can vary greatly. 2
79. Id. at -, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414, 751 P.2d at 473.
80. Design defect contemplates that a safer alternative design is possible, such as a less harmful
drug that is equally or more effective. The court noted that a drug might be made safer if it is withheld
from the market until scientific skill and knowledge advance to the point where additional dangerous side
effects are revealed. However, in most cases such a delay in marketing new drugs would not serve the
public welfare. Public policy favors the development of beneficial new drugs, even though some risks
might accompany their introduction, because drugs can save fives and reduce pain and suffering. Id. at
245 Cal. Rptr. at 419, 751 P.2d at 479.
81. Prior to Brown, the classic case considering the appropriateness of applying strict liability to
manufacturers was Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984). The court examined
a line of cases indicating that when the essential nature of a transaction involves a service rather than
a product, public policy may dictate, in view of the status of the provider, that the general welfare is
served better by inapplicability of the strict liability doctrine. The court noted that drug manufacturers
do not fall within the policy exceptions expressed in the line of cases it examined. Therefore, the court
found no justification for giving all prescription drug manufacturers a blanket immunity from strict liability
claims. However, the court permitted the use of the state-of-the-art defense, wherein the defendant is
held liable only regarding what it knew or should have known.
82. See Gleeson, Exclusion of Animal Data as Evidence of Chemically-Induced Disease, 29(10) FOR
Tim Da-iNSE 25 (Oct. 1987).
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The ongoing Bendectin83 litigation is an example of the difficulties
courts may have with expert testimony regarding teratogenicity. In
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow,14 the critical issue was the sufficiency of
the evidence used by the plaintiff's expert in concluding that Bendectin
caused the plaintiff's birth defects. The expert testified 5 that he con-
sidered four kinds of evidence: (1) structure-activity information,8 6 (2)
in vivo studies, 87 (3) in vitro studies,88 and (4) epidemiological studies.8 9
He could not say that any of these four types of evidence individually
demonstrated that Bendectin causes birth defects. But he testified that,
collectively, the studies show Bendectin to be a teratogen, and the
jury held for the plaintiff based on this testimony. 90 Apparently think-
ing that four nothings cannot add up to something, the trial judge
entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was reversed
on appeal with directions to reinstate the verdict. 91 Subsequently, a
new trial was ordered by a different trial judge based on alleged per-
jury of the expert.92
83. Bendectin, as originally designed, was a combination of three components: decyclomine hy-
drochloride, doxylamine succinate, and pyridoxine (Vitamin B6). This combination was approved by the
FDA in 1956 for use in alleviating morning sickness in pregnancy. In 1976, the combination was altered
to omit dicyclomine hydrochloride. There have been numerous cases in which it has been alleged that
Bendectin causes human birth defects. In 1983, in the face of a host of lawsuits, the manufacturer withdrew
Bendectin from the market because of the cost of defending the lawsuits. More than anything else, the
Bendectin story is one of regulatory failure. This is a product that is necessary therapy for pregnant
women whose nausea prevents consumption of foods necessary for both maternal and fetal nutrition, but
it was being overused by women who could have done without it and who did not know that complete
safety is impossible to prove. Regulatory action to restrict use of the drug and to expand warnings of
the uncertainty surrounding the drug's fetal toxicity might have kept it on the market so that it could
still be used by those who need it. See Comment, Drugs During Pregnancy: Dangerous Business-The
Continued Movement to Provide Adequate Warning for the Consumer, 62 NEB. L. REv. 526 (1983).
84. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow, 506 A.2d 1100 (App. D.C. 1986).
85. Id. at 1104.
86. This involves the examination of a chemical compound's physical structure and a prediction
of what kind of activity that compound will have, based on knowledge of the structure and activity of
similar compounds.
87. These are animal studies. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
88. Literally this means "in glass." Such studies permit a scientist to separate specific tissue from
the rest of an embryo, place it in a test tube, and observe it to determine whether its development is
thwarted by the drug.
89. These are human studies. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
90. Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1110 (App. D.C. 1986).
91. The appellate court ioted that the four types of evidence "showed little or nothing when viewed
separately from one another, but they combined to produce a whole that was greater than the sum of
its parts. . . ." Id.
92. The court aggressively defended its action by describing the nature of the false statements:
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Expert testimony was the focal point of another teratogenicity case,
Wells v. Ortho.93 Two experts indicated that as soon as the first study
is done resulting in any information that gives the "hint [of] a
possibility" 94 of a drug causing birth defects, the drug's labeling should
be changed to reflect a warning. The plaintiff's verdict and affirmance
came as a surprise to the drug distribution community, where tra-
ditionally labeling has not been changed based on the hint of a pos-
sibility. Generally, a definite relationship between a drug and an adverse
effect is required before a labeling change is made.95 The Wells case
suggests that disclosure of possible teratogenicity should be made even
before scientific data has been fully evaluated. This approach places
a burden on the manufacturer to recognize and convey relevant in-
formation even before the significance of the information is under-
stood. It also places the burden of uncertainty largely on the shoulders
of the user, who must decide how this uninterpreted information should
be factored into a decision to use or not use the drug.
The only reported appellate opinion that has considered liability
for isotretinoin induced birth defects is Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche.96
That court held that, while the adequacy of a warning is usually a
jury question, in this case the warning was adequate as a matter of
law.97 The court further reasoned that even had the warning been
The court finds that his testimony was so deliberately false that all his testimony on behalf of
plaintiff is suspect. His lies went so much toward enhancing his status as a witness that he
reeks of the hired gun who will say anything that money can buy so long as it is glibly consistent
with his prior testimony in other cases. In a proverbial spiral his professional witness
status led him to shirk his duties at the Wayne State Medical School. That got him fired (gently,
by a forced resignation). The true circumstances of that resignation detracted from his pro-
fessional witness status, and so he covered it up with lies to maintain his purported status.
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow, No. 1245-82 Memorandum Order 4 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
93. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985) aff'd, 788 F.2d 741
(1th Cir. 1986). The trial court opinion in this case is fascinating because it was a bench trial in which
the judge gave an in-depth description of all the testimony, including his subjective assessment of it.
94. Wells, 615 F. Supp. at 276.
95. The circuit court acknowledged that the FDA, faced with the same information as the trial
court, had decided that a warning should not be placed on the label. However, the court stated that an
FDA determination that a warning is not necessary may be sufficient for federal regulatory purposes but
still not be sufficient for state tort law purposes. Wells, 788 F.2d at 746.
96. Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 513 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
97. The court stated, "It is inconcievable that reasonable persons could disagree as to the adequacy
of the warnings in conveying to physicians that the prescription drug, Accutane, is dangerous to pregnant
women and should not have been prescribed." Id. at 1320.
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insufficient, it would not have been the proximate cause of the harm
because the prescribing physician was "completely aware" of the ter-
atogenic effects of the drug and would have nevertheless prescribed
the drug.98
In summary, the manufacturer's exposure to legal liability for drug
induced birth defects relates entirely to the adequacy of drug testing
and labeling. The uncertainty of adverse drug effects (including ter-
atogenicity) is recognized under the law through the requirement that
the manufacturer must discover only what can be known about its
product; therefore, a manufacturer is not charged with knowledge of
the unknowable. Requiring that a manufacturer label a product with
scientifically uncertain information, as the Wells case would seem to
require, is probably a liability reducing factor insofar as the manu-
facturer is concerned. The manufacturer's logical response to such a
requirement would be to create overly broad warnings that serve as
compelling defense evidence in litigation alleging inadequate disclo-
sure, but provide little in the way of useful information for the phy-
sician and patient. In this regard, a position that appears to be initially
favorable to the plaintiff in litigation is in fact the basis for con-
structing a solid defense and is apparently unfavorable to the patient
in therapeutics.
B. The Prescribing Physician as Defendant
Litigation alleging malpractice against physicians for prescribing a
drug that has caused a birth defect occurs less frequently than does
drug product liability litigation. The key issues in the few reported
opinions available for analysis relate to the knowledge of teratogenicity
that a physician must possess when a drug is prescribed for a pregnant
woman and the requirement that information regarding teratogenicity
be disclosed to the patient.9 Sub-issues within the area of disclosure
98. Id. at 1321.
99. Risk disclosure within the context of drug therapy poses issues distinct from those involving
surgery or most other non-drug medical treatments. Since patients usually administer drugs to themselves,
they are in the best position to measure the effects of the drugs and to modify or discontinue drug use
depending on the perceived outcome. In therapy, each time a patient ingests a drug the patient has made
a micro-decision that, for the patient at the time, the benefit of the drug outweighs the risk. Studies have
19881
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are the test of materiality for risk disclosure and the identities of
parties to whom disclosure must be made (woman or fetus or both).
The case of Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.'°° considers the level
of knowledge required of physicians when prescribing drugs and when
advising patients regarding the use of drugs during pregnancy. When
Dilantin was prescribed for Mrs. Harbeson, none of the doctors knew
that the drug could cause fetal hydantoin syndrome (FSH). °'0 The
district court found that a search of the literature would have revealed
several articles regarding the correlation of Dilantin and FSH. In ad-
dition, there was evidence that the warning in the Physician's Desk
Reference (PDR)'0 was sufficient to put physicians on notice as to
the effect of the drug. The defense queried how a doctor ought to
know that he does not know whether there is information that need
be disclosed. In response, the circuit court indicated that to justify
ignorance of this type of risk would insulate the medical profession
beyond what is legally acceptable. In summary, that court held that
it was not unreasonable to expect the doctors in this case to discover
the risk.'03
The Harbeson case next considered whether the risks Dilantin posed
to the fetus were material. The court applied a two-step test of ma-
shown that patients often are "noncompliant" with prescribed drug therapy. One possible explanation
for deviation by patients from the doctor's instructions is that patients are self-regulators with regard to
drug therapy. See Conrad, The Meanings of Medications: Another Look at Compliance, 20 Soc. Sci.
& MED. 29 (1985). To make good decisions about drug choice and drug use, patients must be given
adequate information about drugs. See Brushwood and Simonsmeier, Drug Information for Patients:
Duties of the Manufacturer, Pharmacist, Physician, and Hospital, 7 J. LEGAL Mar. 279 (1986). The
special character of drug disclosure information in informed consent cases has been judicially recognized.
See Tietz, Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case, 61 VAsH. L. Rav. 367
(1986).
100. Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1984). The state court opinion considering
two certified questions is discussed supra notes 29 through 39 and accompanying text. That opinion
considered whether wrongful life and wrongful birth exist as viable theories of recovery in Washington.
The liability issues of this case are discussed in the main opinion. Id.
101. See supra note 37, and accompanying text.
102. This is a voluntary, commercial publication that reprints approved labeling for drugs that man-
ufacturers wish to have included. See Niblack v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D. Colo. 1977).
The Harbeson case quotes the following language from the PDR published at the time Dilantin was
prescribed for Mrs. Harbeson: "Although evidence of a teratogenic effect in thehuman has not been
established, the use of this drug in pregnancy requires that its potential benefits be weighted against
possible hazards to the fetus." Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 523. Apparently the court felt that this "notice"
triggered a responsibility to conduct a literature search.
103. Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 525.
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teriality incorporating an objective standard, °4 the first step being to
define the existence and nature of the risk and its likelihood of oc-
currence. The second step is to decide whether the probability of that
type of harm is a risk which a reasonable patient would consider in
deciding on treatment.105 The court referred to expert testimony pre-
sented at trial and agreed that this testimony satisfied the first step
in the materiality test. The court also concluded that a reasonable
patient would have considered the risk of teratogenicity in deciding
on treatment. Therefore, the appeals court upheld the finding by the
district court that the risks posed by Dilantin were material, noting
that the goal of risk disclosure is to make the patient an active par-
ticipant in the decisionmaking process.l °6
If a risk is material, then it must be disclosed to the patient. In
the unusual case of Roberts v. Patel,0 7 the court was asked to decide
whether the fetus, as well as the mother, is a patient. 108 The facts of
this case disclose that, while the natural mother was in labor, the
defendant physicians advised that the labor should be temporarily halted
by the use of alcohol and other drugs. Allegedly as the result of this
treatment, the child suffered permanent spastic quadriplegia. A lawsuit
was initiated by the adoptive mother of the child, but the natural
mother was not a party to the lawsuit. The defendants moved to
dismiss this claim with respect to its informed consent count °9
The defendants first argued that Illinois law did not recognize the
right of a parent to consent to medical treatment on behalf of an
104. Id. at 523. The objective standard asks whether a reasonable patient would consider the risk
material. It has its origin in the landmark case, Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). There may be a trend toward a subjective standard which asks whether
this particular patient would consider the risk material. See Cheung v. Cunningharm, 214 N.J. Super.
649, 520 A.2d 832 (1987); Arena v. Ginguich, 84 Or. App. 25, 733 P.2d 75 (1987) aff'd, 748 P.2d 547
(1987).
105. Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 523.
106. Id. at 524. The court referred to Katz, Informed Consent, A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 137 (1977).
107. Roberts v. Patel, 620 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
108. Id. Other courts have answered this question in the affirmative with little or no rationale. See,
e.g., Vaccaro v. Squibb, 71 A.D.2d 270, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1979), in which the court held that the doctor
owed a duty of care to the mother and to the child. Id.
109. Roberts, 620 F. Supp. at 324.
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unborn fetus. But the court held that a parent may properly give
consent for treatment on behalf of her unborn fetus. 110
The defendants then argued that the only duty of disclosure owed
was to the natural mother, who was not a party to the action."' The
court rejected this argument, citing a line of Illinois fetal rights cases,
and concluded:
In light of the strong Illinois policy favoring protection of a fetus, and in light of
Illinois' recognition of a protectable interest in the fetus in ordinary malpractice
claims, even prior to conception, we hold that [the] mother's physicians owed a duty
of informed disclosure not only to [the] mother, but to [the child] as well; in this
situation the physician had two patients.z
Obviously, recognizing a duty of disclosure to a fetus is one thing
while a realistic way of meeting the duty is an entirely separate matter.
In the ensuing discussion, the court indicated that, while there is a
duty of disclosure to the fetus, this duty can be met by informing
the woman of the risks to the fetus."'
Thus, when a physician treats a pregnant woman, there are in
reality two patients being treated, and both patients may bring an
action against the physician based on informed consent. The guide
for disclosure is materiality, the presumption being that individuals
have a right to determine what shall be done with their bodies. Ter-
atogenicity would appear to be of such a significant character that if
teratogenic potential is disclosed to the physician by the manufacturer,
it likewise must be disclosed by the physician to the patient. While
theoretically possible, it is difficult to imagine a pregnant woman who
would not want to consider the possibility of fetal harm when deciding
whether or not to use a drug.
110. "This court is at a loss to say who may consent to the treatment of an unborn fetus if not
the unborn fetus' parent." Id. at 324.
I. Id. at 325.
112. Id. at 326.
113. The court stated:
The risks coincident with the prescibed treatment flowed primarily to the infant. The physician
must have a duty to disclose to his patient risks not only to the mother but to the child as
well. In making an informed decision, [the] natural mother was concerned not only about risk
of the treatment to her own safety but also to her unborn child. Indeed, the risks to her child
may have been paramount in her concerns.
Id.
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C. The Mother as Defendant
Pregnancy is a unique situation because of the direct and im-
mediate impact the conduct of one party may have on the interests
of another. A pregnant woman is in virtually complete control of the
in utero development of the fetus, which will eventually determine the
child's health and welfare. The possibility that negligent behavior by
a pregnant woman may harm the fetus has led to a limited volume
of litigation where the objective is to determine how far the law will
go to punish or compensate for negligent behavior by a pregnant
woman who created an unreasonable risk of harm to her fetus. The
state may choose to institute criminal proceedings against a woman
whose conduct during pregnancy caused harm to the fetus. In 1986,
a California woman was charged with willfully omitting to furnish
medical services to her child.114 Allegedly, the woman disregarded med-
ical advice to discontinue using amphetamines during pregnancy, to
abstain from sexual intercourse, and to seek immediate medical at-
tention if she began to hemorrhage. Her child was born with brain
damage and died within two months due to injuries suffered in utero.115
Criminal charges were later dismissed against this woman because the
intent of the statute is to force payment from fathers who are delin-
quent in paying support.11 6 While the constitutional issue comparing
the privacy rights of women with the state's interest in protecting the
unborn child was not resolved, the judge indicated in dicta that he
thought the legislature could draft constitutional legislation prohibiting
harmful conduct against a viable fetus.1 1 7 Although no state has yet
enacted such legislation, several commentators have called for it.118
114. See Woman Charged over Her Conduct in Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at A22, col.
1. The woman was charged under California Penal Code § 270. The statute provides in relevant part:
"If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food,
shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a mis-
demeanor. .. ." CAL. PENAL CoDE § 270 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988). The statute further provides that
a "child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person insofar as this section is concerned."
Id. The prosecutor could not have used California's general child abuse statute, § 273a, because in Reyes
v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977), the court held that § 273a does not
explicity cover fetuses.
115. See N.Y. Times article, supra note 114.
116. See, A.B.A. 1. 37 (Apr. 1, 1987).
117. Id.
118. See Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 1
(1984); Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL.
L. Rav. 1209 (1987).
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The legal duty of a pregnant woman to her fetus has also been
addressed within the context of civil liability where the conflict is
between mother and child, rather than between mother and state. The
only appellate opinion squarely on point is Grodin v. Grodin."9 In
this case a child, through his father, appealed a grant of summary
judgment dismissing his mother as a defendant in a lawsuit brought
by him. The child had developed brown and discolored teeth as the
result of his mother's ingestion of the drug tetracycline 20 during preg-
nancy. He alleged negligence of his mother in falling to seek proper
medical care, failing to request that her physician perform a pregnancy
test, and falling to inform her physician that she was taking tetra-
cycline. The trial court granted summary judgment based on parent-
child tort immunity.12'
The appellate court recognized that the Michigan Supreme Court
had overruled the doctrine of intrafamily immunity in Plumley v.
Klein."2 In that case, the exercise of reasonable parental discretion
was retained as an exception to the new rule that a child could sue
a parent. 1 The Grodin court acknowledged that a woman's decision
to continue taking drugs during pregnancy is an exercise of her dis-
cretion,14 but the reasonableness of that exercise of discretion is a
fact question. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment for the
mother was reversed and the case remanded for a determination of
the reasonableness of the alleged negligent conduct. However, the court
provided no indication of the parameters for determining the standard
of a reasonable pregnant woman. 12s
As a defendant in a civil action brought by a child for damages
caused by maternal conduct, the child's mother is held to a standard
119. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
120. Tetracycline is an antibacterial drug that readily crosses the placenta and may deposit in bone
and teeth. Because the drug also concentrates in the skin, it is useful in treating acne. Thus it is used
chronically by adolescents who may be fertile and sexually active.
121. See Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 869. Once considered contrary to sound
public policy, courts have begun to permit children to sue their parents, recognizing a "reasonable parent"
standard. See, e.g., Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980); Stallman v. Youngquist,
152 Ill. App. 3d 683, 504 N.E.2d 920 (1987).
122. Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972).
123. A determination that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable takes the action out of this
exception in Plumley, and parental immunity is not available as a defense. Id. at 8, 199 N.W.2d at 173.
124. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
125. Id. at 401-02, 301 N.W.2d at 871.
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similar to that applied to other defendants in negligence cases. In civil
liability a "duty" arises as the result of a relationship between in-
dividuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit
of the other. 26 The nature of the relationship determines the character
of the duty, and the special nature of the relationship between woman
and fetus will dictate the parameters of the reasonable pregnant woman
standard as it develops.
IV. BURDENS AND RESPONSMILITIES
A. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturer
The uncertainty that accompanies the approval of new drugs as
safe and effective is disturbing in the area of teratogenicity. Animal
studies are the only available premarketing indicator of human risk,
but species-specific characteristics make it impossible to draw absolute
conclusions about humans based on animal data alone. If current drug
testing requirements appear inadequate, then the obvious answer is to
require better research. But reducing the level of uncertainty through
changes in research design that may increase the reliability of ex-
trapolations from animal data to man is an unrealistic goal. As ap-
pealing as the concept may be, meaningful and less uncertain studies
cannot be done. At best, teratogenic hazards shown by animal tests
serve as a screen to identify agents for which developmental toxicity
may be of primary concern in humans. Positive results of teratoge-
nicity studies in animals simply suggest that the human population
should not be exposed to certain agents unless it is therapeutically
essential.' 27
On the other hand, one may legitimately question whether man-
ufacturers are meeting their responsibilities in the area of post-mar-
keting surveillance, where changes could be made to improve the quality
of available information and thereby reduce the level of uncertainty.
Problems currently exist with birth defect monitoring programs, but
126. W. KEErON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 53 (5th ed. 1984).
127. Brown & Fabro, The Value of Animal Teratogenicity Testing for Predicting Human Risk, 26
CLiN. Onsrmiucs & GYNEcoLoGy 467 (1963).
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they can be addressed through improvements in study design. 128 Phar-
maceutical manufacturers can undertake more comprehensive pro-
grams to evaluate teratogenic effects in humans. The difficulty in
obtaining useful data prior to marketing should increase the respon-
sibility to conduct reliable surveillance once a drug is on the market
and to disseminate scientific data in a way that reduces the uncertainty
of drug use. Imposing a substantial burden on manufacturers to clar-
ify, through post-marketing studies, the ambiguous implications of
pre-marketing tests is consistent with the requirement that marketed
drugs be comprehensively studied for safety and efficacy. 129
If scientific uncertainty cannot be eliminated, then there is a re-
sponsibility to share that uncertainty with those whose interests may
be affected. Being told what is not known about a drug may be as
important as being told what is known. Obviously, however, there
must be limits. There must be some scientific basis for the warning
of potential teratogenicity; otherwise, every drug could carry a warning
based upon a theoretical, but untestable, concern. 30 Yet the possibility
of overwarning must not be used as a license to prevent the acquisition
of knowledge by members of society, thereby shielding drug manu-
facturers from their disclosure responsibility. Likewise, manufacturers
128. Khoury & Holtzman, On the Ability of Birth Defects Monitoring to Detect New Teratogens,
126 Am. J. EPmiai~osooY 136 (1987).
129. Recent emphasis on post-marketing surveillance recognizes that no matter how extensive pre-
marketing studies may be, some questions about a new drug will always be unanswered. At present the
most important post-marketing surveillance program is the spontaneous reporting of drug effects. This
program, though valuable, suffers due to the possibility of incomplete information. See generally Sills,
Farch, Milstien & Turner, The Process of Adverse Reaction Reports at FDA, 20 DRtua INForWATIoN 151
(1986). The authors review the implications of the FDA regulation found at 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1987).
The FDA may request that a manufacturer conduct post-marketing surveillance studies, presumably in
return for which the drug is approved by the agency for marketing. See Hagler, Luscumbe & Stegfried,
A Primer on Postmarketing Surveillance, 21 DRuG INFoR MAToN 67, 107 (1987).
130. The FDA itself has recognized the cost of overwarning, noting:
Labeling is not intended to be a dispositive treatise of all possible data and information
about a drug- It is intended instead to advise about potential hazards and to convey documented
statements concerning safety and effectiveness. The act permits labeling statements with respect
to safety only if they are supported by scientific evidence ...
The Commissioner concludes that drug labeling should include a contraindication only
when reasonable evidence exists indicating an association between the drug and a hazard. The
Commissioner believes that including theoretical hazards as contraindications in drug labeling
would cause that very important section of the labeling to lose its significance.
44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,441, 37,446-47 (1979).
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should not be permitted to shift the burden of uncertainty to others
through indiscriminate disclosure. The line between overwarning and
underwarning is a thin one, and if a mistake is to be made in providing
the correct level of information regarding teratogenicity, the better
mistake is overdisclosure rather than underdisclosure.
Traditionally, the law has recognized that the duty owed by the
drug manufacturer to the patient is to disclose information about drug
risks to the physician but not directly to the patient.13" ' This "pre-
scription drug rule" has been criticized generally132 and specifically
with regard to teratogenicity,13 3 the criticism focusing on the respon-
sibility to protect the patient's right to know about material risks. In
an attempt to protect the patient, a comprehensive program of direct-
to-patient warnings was adopted by the FDA in 1980 but was later
revoked.1 34 Moreover, litigation that would have modified the pre-
scription drug rule has not been warmly received. 35 The problem of
inadequate information is a very real one in the area of teratogenicity,
where studies indicate that pregnant women want to know the prob-
ability that a drug may have adverse fetal effects, but they are not
131. The phrase "learned intermediary doctrine" was first used to describe this rule in Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966), where the court distinguished prescription drugs from
what it called "normal consumer items." Id. Justification for the learned intermediary doctrine was
presented subsequently in other cases. In Terhune v. A.H. Robins, 90 Wash. 2d 9, 577 P.2d 975 (1978),
the court reasoned that only the physician considers the total health and well-being of the patient. Since
the patient places primary reliance upon the physician's judgment, and since the physician decides what
facts should be told to the patient, it is reasonable to consider as adequate a warning that is given by
the manufacturer to the physician but not directly to the patient.
132. Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs, and Patient Information, 30 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 633 (1986).
133. See Comment, Drugs During Pregnancy: Dangerous Business-The Continued Movement to
Provide Adequate Warnings for the Consumer, 62 NEB. L. Rnv. 526 (1983).
134. Federally mandated patient directed labeling came into being on September 12, 1980, when the
FDA published its final regulation announcing its intention to apply the regulations on a trial basis to
ten drugs or drug classes. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754 (1980) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 203). The regulations
were to become effective 180 days after the publication of final guidelines for the specific drugs or drug
classes. On February 19, 1981, President Reagan, by executive order, directed the suspension or post-
ponement of the effective dates of all major rules that had been promulgated in final form, but had not
yet become effective. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). On September 7, 1982, the FDA revoked the rule,
calling the program "unjustifiable" and expressing the belief that expanding privately sponsored initiatives
were preferable to a federal mandate. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147 (1982) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 203).
135. See generally Schwartz, Consumer Warnings for Oral Contraceptives: A New Exception to the
Prescription Drug Rule, 41 Foot DRuG Cos. L.J. 241 (1986).
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receiving the information. 3 6 Under such circumstances, responsible
maternal decisionmaking is not possible.
Thus, as the best expert on its own drug, a manufacturer should
also be the best source of information. This means not only that the
best scientific methods be used to obtain information, but also that
the information be conveyed to those who need it to make a decision
about drug risks. Information leaflets directed to the consumer would
be an effective means of accomplishing this objective. Alternatively,
labeling directed to the physician should have a separate section des-
ignated as "fetal toxicity information for the patient" in which specific
language is used to describe what is known about teratogenicity and
what is suspected but not yet confirmed. The physician could use this
information to help women understand the risk of drug use to a fetus
that they are or may be carrying. The system currently includes a
requirement that drugs be better coded for teratogenic potential,'37 and
withholding that information from patients through the "prescription
drug rule" serves no useful purpose.
B. The Prescribing Physician
A physician's responsibilities in dealing with a woman who is or
may be pregpant differ from those in other areas of medicine since
considerations arise concerning both the fetus and the woman. Tech-
nology has advanced to the point that the fetus can be monitored or
even visualized, making it possible to regard the fetus as a separate
but dependent patient. In treating both patients, the physician has a
responsibility to disclose information about drug risks and benefits,
particularly insofar as these risks or benefits may relate to one party
but not the other. It is safe to assume tha in all but the most unusual
circumstances a pregnant woman will make a decision that accounts
for the best interests of her fetus. However, when this does not occur,
the physician may have a responsibility to intervene to assure that the
fetus' best interests have been considered in another way.
136. See generally Woodward, Brackbill, McManus, Doering & Robinson, Exposure to Drugs Wit/i
Possible Adverse Effects During Pregnancy & Birth, 9 BmT 165 (1982); See also Y. BiuxcKBIt, K.
McMArus & L. WOODWARD, MEDICATION IN MATERNITY: INFANr ExostUR & MATERNAL IN TORATION
(1985).
137. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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For those few drugs that are recognized teratogens or fetal toxins,
the physician's responsibility would appear to be simply that such
drugs should not be prescribed during pregnancy. But there are several
complicating factors. Conception does not immediately cause the oc-
currence of physiological or psychological changes, so a fertile and
sexually active woman faces the constant possibility of being pregnant
and not knowing it. The physician has the responsibility of helping
the patient manage this problem through contraceptive advice and
possibly by recommending a waiting period before initiating drug ther-
apy, to either confirm or rule out pregnancy. When a patient con-
templates using a drug that is of benefit to her but potentially harmful
to the fetus, she has a right to know the character of the risk. This
involves not only the simple disclosure of information, but also pro-
vision of the opportunity for reflection and assistance with a deci-
sion. 3'
A far greater problem is presented by drugs that are suspected but
unconfirmed teratogens or fetal toxins. It has been suggested that
physicians feel particularly uncomfortable dealing with uncertainty in
obstetrics.13 9 Admitting to a patient that the teratogenic risk of a rec-
ommended drug is unknown is a difficult admission because it rec-
ognizes fallibility. Physicians are unlikely to admit to patients that:
(1) they are acting with uncertainty; (2) there are multiple decision
strategies under uncertainty, ranging from high risk-averse ones to less
risk-averse ones; (3) physicians prefer a strategy that focuses on fetal
risk and preventing it; and (4) this strategy may decrease maternal
benefit or increase maternal risk. 4° Yet the physician's disclosure re-
sponsibility is to assist the patient in understanding the information
that is available, limited though it may be. No matter what a phar-
maceutical manufacturer may do to increase the availability of in-
formation, the manufacturer cannot write a warning directed to each
individual patient. Only the physician knows the unique characteristics
of the patient's lifestyle and values. It is the physician who can disclose
138. See generally J. KATz, Trm SENr Woaim OF DOCTOR AND PATIEr (1984).
139. Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special Problems, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REv.
67 (1987).
140. Id. at 72.
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risk-related information and then instruct the patient on the deci-
sionmaking strategies available.
A pregnant woman may make a decision with which her physician
disagrees. This will most likely occur when another physician has pre-
scribed a large supply of medication for a woman who then becomes
pregnant and continues using the medication contrary to her obste-
trician's advice. It could also happen that a woman who is using
medication would disregard her physician's advice to avoid pregnancy.
Under such circumstances, the physician may attempt to coerce the
woman into adopting rational behavior either through counseling (You
don't want to do anything that will hurt your baby, do you?) or by
eliminating availability of the medication. But patient behavior is not
irrational simply because it is contrary to what the physician believes
is correct. The physician's responsibility is to inform and assist with
a decision; once an informed decision is made by the patient, the
physician's responsibility is to treat the patient within the parameters
of that decision.
It seems unlikely that a pregnant woman would intentionally ingest
a teratogenic drug for the express purpose of harming her fetus or
that a pregnant woman would recklessly endanger her fetus by de-
ciding to use a drug that is beneficial to her without considering pos-
sible fetal harm. Should it become apparent to a physician that either
of these situations existed, there would be a responsibility to the fetus
to have a risk-benefit decision made from the fetal perspective. There
have been suggestions that child abuse or neglect statutes should apply
under such circumstances, 141 which would require that the physician
make a report to a child welfare agency for appropriate action. An
approach of this type, which criminalizes maternal conduct, distorts
the physician-patient relationship, resulting in distrust that may harm
more fetuses than it helps. A far better approach would be to require
physicians to enlist the assistance of another family member (husband,
mother, etc.) or a friend who is familiar with the woman's environ-
ment and social circumstances. That person could consider the risks
141. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human
Life, 22 HAv. J. oN LEaas. 97 (1985); M. Shaw, Should Child Abuse Laws Be Extended to Include
Fetal Abuse?, GENETcs & TnE LAw III chap. 22 (A. Milunshky and G. Areas eds. 1987).
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and benefits of drug use from the fetal perspective and could either
affirm or reject the woman's decision. If the decision were rejected,
the woman could be confronted by the physician and the selected
decisionmaker with a firm request that the woman's decision be re-
considered. Beyond this rather extreme step, the physician should have
no further responsibility.
C. The Pregnant Woman
A pregnant woman has a responsibility to manage her medication
use in a way that accounts for the risks and benefits of drugs both
to herself and to the fetus she carries. Since fetal harm can directly
result from maternal use of drugs, one approach to prenatal duty
would be to impose a responsibility upon pregnant women to com-
pletely avoid the use of potentially teratogenic drugs. Yet such a duty
could be viewed as inconsistent with a woman's constitutionally guar-
anteed right to make certain intimate decisions regarding reproductive
matters. 142
In Roe v. Wade143 the Supreme Court determined that a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy falls within the zone of privacy
protected by the Constitution.44 The Court recognized two state in-
terests as sufficiently compelling to override this constitutional guar-
antee: protecting the health of the woman and protecting the
potentiality of human life as represented by the fetus.145 The Court
concluded that the state's interest in the potentiality of human life
becomes compelling only at the point of fetal "viability," after which
the fetus can survive independently of the mother's womb. 46 The Court
placed this point at approximately the beginning of the third trimester
of pregnancy. 4 7
142. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute proscribing married couples
from using contraceptives violates right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (single persons'
right to use birth control upheld); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(statute requiring spousal consent prior to abortion violates woman's right to have an abortion).
143. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
144. Id. at 153.
145. Id. at 162.
146. Id. at 163. The Court also determined that the state's interest in maternal health does not
become sufficiently compelling to regulate abortion at all until the end of the first trimester.
147. Id.
19881
37
Brushwood: rug Induced Birth Defects: Difficult Decisions and Shared Respon
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
If a prenatal duty is imposed prior to viability, that duty may
appear unconstitutional under the analysis of Roe v. Wade.148 A wom-
an's right to abort and the state's interest in protecting fetal life cannot
coexist. But the state's interest in protecting fetal health, as opposed
to fetal life, can exist simultaneously with the woman's right to abort.
The Roe decision extends the right of privacy to a decision by pregnant
women not to bear a child. Among other things, this right protects
women from having to assume a responsibility which they feel they
cannot undertake, but a woman who decides not to abort accepts the
responsibility of pregnancy and childbirth. Also, state intervention to
protect fetal health prior to viability, when a woman has decided not
to abort, may be legitimate under Roe. Preventing a woman from
causing harm to a fetus she has decided not to abort is distinguishable
from requiring a woman to carry the fetus to term against her will.
The latter requirement may have a lasting and detrimental impact on
the woman while the former preventive action is likely to be beneficial
to the woman, assuming that the burden of rearing a healthy child
is less than the burden of rearing a child born defective.
A woman's responsibility not to cause harm to a fetus, once she
has foregone the exercise of her legal right to terminate the pregnancy,
must impose certain limitations on her freedom of action. In deciding
whether a woman acted improperly by exposing her fetus to an un-
reasonable risk of harm, it is necessary to evaluate both the magnitude
and probability of harm to the fetus posed by hazard exposure and
the magnitude and probability of harm to the woman posed by hazard
avoidance. Invariably this analysis will occur after the risk has ma-
terialized, so care must be taken not to overemphasize the reality of
fetal harm; for when the woman made her decision, the harm was
a theoretical probability and not yet a reality. The result of the analysis
will be a comparison of the woman's actual behavior with that of the
"reasonable pregnant woman" described in Grodin.149
Because the relationship between mother and fetus is unique among
interpersonal relationships, the standard for reasonable maternal con-
148. Most teratogenic effects occur during the first trimester. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying
text.
149. See supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
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duct requires unique analysis. Cherniak develops a realistic model of
maternal liability for prenatal injury, limited entirely to gross negli-
gence.'50 Within this model, for there to be liability a conscious dis-
regard for the welfare of the fetus would have to be proved. Only
if it could be shown that the woman knew or should have known
that her conduct created a substantial risk of serious harm to the fetus
and the cost to her of avoiding the risk was minimal would there be
liability. The focus is on the woman's actual or constructive knowledge
and on her responsibility to consider the risk to the fetus as well as
the risk to herself prior to engaging in risky behavior. Thus the in-
gestion of potentially teratogenic medication would not be actionable
unless the woman knew or should have known that there was the
possibility of harm to the fetus and she disregarded that knowledge
in deciding to use the drug. A pregnant woman who has considered
fetal risk, has used a drug, and has given birth to a defective child
has not acted unreasonably unless the risk is so frequent and so severe
that it would be clearly deemed unacceptable when compared with
the usual and customary behavior of other pregnant women.
V. CONCLUSION
Regulatory policy aimed at reducing fetal exposure to unreasonable
teratogenic risk has as its central focus the generation, dissemination,
and responsible use of information relating to teratogenicity. Man-
ufacturers generate the information through scientific research and
disseminate it through product labeling. Physicians further disseminate
the information by interpreting its significance for a particular patient,
and they encourage rational decisions by explaining the risks and ben-
efits of drug use for a patient. Pregnant women use the information
to weigh the pros and cons of medications, including risks and benefits
to the fetus. If a child is born with defects that could have been
prevented by better generation, dissemination, or use of information,
then liability issues may arise.
Regulatory response to the demonstration of a firm link between
isotretinoin and birth defects has been swift and sure, relating pri-
150. Cherniak, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The Right of a Child Against Its Mother, 10 SuFoLK
U.L. Rv. 582, 607 (1976).
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marily to the better use of information rather than restrictions on
drug availability. 151 But for the vast majority of commonly used drugs,
information necessary to make a meaningful risk-benefit decision is
unavailable. 5 2 The teratogenicity information required by the FDA to
appear in product labeling often is not there.'53 Labeling that does
contain the information is directed to the physician rather than the
patient, and it frequently admonishes that risks and benefits to the
fetus must be considered, without explaining the nature of the risks.
The child whose life is diminished by adverse drug effects in utero
has a right of action against those who did not afford the child,
through its mother, the opportunity to consider the risks of drug use.
Current inadequacies in drug labeling suggest that responsibilities to
the fetus that have developed through civil litigation are not being
met. By enforcement of existing regulations and by expansion of those
regulations to assure dissemination of meaningful information about
teratogenicity directly to women who are or may be pregnant, the
drug distribution community would collectively meet its responsibility
and facilitate appropriate maternal decisions about fetal risk.
151. The manufacturer will pay for contraceptive counseling and pregnancy tests for women of child-
bearing age who take the drug. The drug will be sold in limited supplies, in packages of 10 capsules
containing a warning to users. Packages will also contain two unique graphics: a drawing of a malformed
child and an "avoid pregnancy symbol"-a circle and slanted line superimposed across a silhouette of
a pregnant woman. The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 8, 1988, at 10, col. 1.
152. See, supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
153. Id.
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